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Grounded Theory Methodology: Positivism, Hermeneutics, 
and Pragmatism 
 
Lars-Johan Åge 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden 
 
Glaserian grounded theory methodology, which has been widely adopted 
as a scientific methodology in recent decades, has been variously 
characterised as “hermeneutic” and “positivist.” This commentary 
therefore takes a different approach to characterising grounded theory by 
undertaking a comprehensive analysis of: (a) the philosophical paradigms 
of positivism, hermeneutics, and pragmatism; and (b) the general 
philosophical questions of the aims of science and the issue of choosing a 
scientific methodology. The commentary then seeks to position grounded 
theory methodology in terms of these philosophical perspectives. The 
study concludes that grounded theory methodology contains elements of 
positivism, hermeneutics, and pragmatism. In coming to this conclusion, 
the study clarifies the degree to which these three perspectives are found 
within Glaserian grounded theory methodology. Key Words: Grounded 
Theory, Positivism, Hermeneutics, Pragmatism. 
 
Although grounded theory methodology (Glaser, 1978, 1998, 2003; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) has been widely adopted in scientific research in recent decades, this 
qualitative methodology has been the subject of various interpretations and criticisms 
from a variety of perspectives. Some authors have classified grounded theory 
methodology as a positivist methodology (Charmaz, 2006), whereas others have 
considered it to be an interpretive methodology (Brown, 1995; Goulding, 1998). Barney 
Glaser is one of the two originators of grounded theory methodology in 1967 and Glaser 
(1998) himself claimed that the methodology occupied a pragmatic position that went 
beyond other philosophical schools of thought. Regarding the difficulty to classify this 
particular methodology, Gustavsson (1998) mentioned that it has been subjected to 
criticism from both subjectivists and objectivists. 
The present study aims at analysing grounded theory in terms of various 
philosophical schools of thought. It is hoped that such an analysis will provide insights 
regarding the different philosophical perspectives inherent within this particular 
methodology. In other words, the purpose of this commentary is to position Glaserian 
grounded theory methodology in terms of the philosophical paradigms of positivism, 
philosophical hermeneutics, and pragmatism. Also, practical implications of this analysis 
are also discussed.  
The report of this study begins with a brief description of grounded theory 
methodology. Secondly, I present researchers perspective in order to describe my own 
relations to this topic. Thirdly, I use two general question of science in order to position 
the Glaserian grounded theory methodology in terms of the philosophical paradigms of 
positivism, hermeneutics, and pragmatism. Based on this analysis, a picture of Glaserian 
grounded theory methodology is emerging that implies that influences from all these 
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different philosophical traditions are found within this particular methodology, an insight 
that has practical implication in terms of opening up this methodology to a broader use. 
 
Grounded Theory Methodology 
 
According to Glaser (1978), data collection in grounded theory methodology 
begins with a “sociological perspective [of a] general problem area [rather than a] 
preconceived conceptual framework” (p. 44). The researcher thus begins with an attitude 
of openness, which seeks to ensure that the “the emerging of concepts never fails” 
(Glaser, 1978, p. 44).  
The next step involves the generation of various categories by “constant 
comparison” of data through a procedure known as “open coding” (Glaser, 1978; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). According to this procedure, which permeates the whole research 
process, “incidents are compared to incidents [and then] concepts to more incidents” 
(Glaser, 1978, p. 62), in
By continuing this procedure of constant comparison, the researcher then 
establishes a “core category” (Glaser, 1978, p. 95), which is a category that holds all 
other categories together. When the core category has emerged, the researcher undertakes 
the process of selective coding (Glaser, 1978), whereby incoming data are compared to 
the core category in a more precise manner than when the categories were first 
established. In this process of “selective coding,” only variables related to the core 
category are considered.  
 order to generate more conceptual properties. Finally, concepts 
are compared to concepts in order to integrate the theory. 
The way in which the various categories are related is considered under a process 
of theoretical coding (Glaser, 1978). This process is facilitated by the writing down of so-
called “theoretical memos” (Glaser, 1978, p. 83) that elaborate on the theoretical codes. 
These “theoretical memos” represent immediate notations of emerging ideas about 
categories and how they inter-relate. These memos are then sorted into a theoretical 
outline. Finally, a process described as “theoretical writing” (p. 128) is undertaken, 
whereby all the details of the substantive theory are brought together in an overall 
conceptual description that is then integrated with or “weaved into” (Glaser, 1998, p. 
207) the extant literature on the subject. 
It is noteworthy that these various steps are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
conducted concurrently during the overall research process. In doing so, all the steps, 
from data collection to analysis, are guided by the emerging theory (Glaser, 1978). This 
means that the each session in the continuous process of data collection is determined by 
the previous sessions in which the data have been closely examined. This process is 
known as “theoretical sampling” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45). This data-collection 
process continues until theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 61) is reached, 
which indicates that the substantive theory has been satisfactorily developed. 
However, the grounded theory methodology has been subjected to changes and 
variations since it was presented by Glaser and Strauss (1967). One of the first signs of 
the methodology being interpreted differently from the original authors was the work of 
Strauss & Corbin (1990). In practical terms, for example, while Glaser emphasized the 
emergence of concepts, Strauss & Corbin (1990), in a more systematic version of the 
methodology, provided several analytical tools that the researcher could choose from in 
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order to “create” and “construct” a theory from the stories told by the participants. This 
difference was later discussed by Glaser (1992) as the polarities of emergence versus 
forcing (Glaser, 1992).  
Interestingly, what in Strauss & Corbin’s (1990) version of the grounded theory 
methodology has been looked upon as systematic tools that have procedural affinity to 
positivism (Locke, 2001) others find characteristics of post-positivism in Strauss and 
Corbin’s emphasis on context and complexity. Inspired by this emphasis on context and 
complexity, Clarke (2005) argues that she has moved the grounded theory around the 
postmodern turn by developing something called situational analysis, which focuses on 
discourses, narratives, and historical analyses. 
Other researchers (e.g., Charmaz, 2006), emphasize that the connection to the 
researcher is to be made visible as the theory is a construction and results from the 
interplay between the researcher and the respondents.  
 
Researcher’s Perspective 
 
The motivation for this commentary arises from a combination of my academic 
and practical experience with this interesting subject matter. As a doctoral student in 
2002, I soon became interested in grounded-theory methodology, which I pursued with 
enthusiasm in my subsequent postgraduate studies. Given my practical experience as a 
practitioner in selling and sales management, it therefore seemed appropriate to combine 
my theoretical and practical areas of expertise and interest by conducting a grounded-
theory study within the field of business-to-business selling processes. The result of this 
project was a successful postgraduate dissertation entitled: “Business Manoeuvring: A 
Grounded Theory of Complex Selling Processes.”  
While conducting this grounded-theory research, I became increasingly interested 
in the philosophical underpinnings of this particular methodology. However, when 
discussing my research project with academic colleagues, I received conflicting opinions 
regarding the essential nature of grounded-theory methodology. Some colleagues insisted 
that it was a “positivist” methodology, whereas others felt that it was more closely related 
to a “subjectivist perspective.” Intrigued by these conflicting opinions and curious to 
learn more about the philosophical antecedents of this particular methodology, I 
proceeded to study the philosophy of science in general terms with a view to obtaining a 
broader philosophical understanding of the Glaserian nature of grounded theory 
methodology. 
I was interested to discover that the founders of particular scientific 
methodologies, including grounded theory, often fail to explore and explain the 
fundamental philosophical basis of their particular methodologies—even when the 
theoretical and conceptual principles of a given methodology are ostensibly being 
presented. However, in the writings of Laudan (1977, 1984, 1996) and Popper (1963, 
1972), I found some answers to such fundamental questions as: “What are the aims of 
science?” and “How should a scientific methodology be chosen?” By addressing these 
sorts of fundamental questions to Glaserian grounded theory methodology, I discovered 
new and insightful perspectives on the issue of the basic nature of Glaserian grounded 
theory.  
 
1602  The Qualitative Report November 2011 
 
 
 
Approach 
 
This brief introduction reflects how my insights and understanding of grounded-
theory methodology began to form in the initial stages of my research journey, and how 
my perspectives subsequently became enriched by deliberately placing the methodology 
under the spotlight of a rigorous examination of its fundamental philosophical nature. 
The present commentary gathers these ideas and insights together—with a view to 
providing readers interested in grounded theory methodology with a new (and perhaps 
enlightening) perspective on the fundamental philosophical and scientific basis of this 
increasingly popular methodology. 
The purpose of this commentary is to position Glaserian grounded theory 
methodology in terms of the philosophical paradigms of positivism, hermeneutics, and 
pragmatism. Thus, the present commentary seeks to discuss the extent to which the 
original Glaserian grounded theory methodology (as described by Glaser) can be argued 
to have positivist, relativist, and pragmatic characteristics. In undertaking this task, the 
commentary addresses two broader philosophical questions, both of which have been 
previously raised by prominent authors in other contexts—Popper (1963, 1972) in 
discussing the nature of science in general, and Laudan (1977, 1984, 1996) in discussing 
differences between positivism and relativism. These two questions are: 
 
• What is the aim of science? 
• How should a scientific methodology be chosen? 
 
By using these two general and broad philosophical questions the philosophical 
underpinnings of the grounded theory methodology will be clarified. In this analysis, the 
focus is on the original version of grounded theory (Glaserian grounded theory) as 
described by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Glaser (1978, 1998, 2001, 2007). 
 
Aims of Science 
 
Dimensions of a Scientific Theory 
 
According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994), a scientific theory has three distinct 
properties: (1) correspondence; (2) understanding; and (3) usefulness. Alvesson and 
Sköldberg further suggest that a theory: should have elements of all three dimensions 
(even if some dimensions are emphasised more than others in a particular theory); and 
might be more or less valid, with respect to certain dimensions (but not others). In this 
commentary, these three dimensions can be considered as desiderata for scientific 
theories—that is, these dimensions not only represent properties of a theory, but also 
more general aims of science, all of which have significant methodological and 
theoretical implications. Each of these dimensions, and their applicability to a substantive 
theory produced by grounded theory methodology, is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Dimension of correspondence. Popper (1963) was as a positivist interested in the 
“the idea of objective and absolute truth” (p. 224) which he articulated as correspondence 
to the facts (Popper, 1963, p. 223). However, while emphasising correspondence to the 
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facts, Popper (1972) nonetheless argues that “… satisfactory theories must, as a matter of 
principle, transcend empirical instances which gave rise to them” (p. 355).  
The basis for Popper’s (1963) argument was Tarski’s (1933, 1944) theory of truth, 
which, according to Popper, “… rehabilitated the correspondence theory of absolute or 
objective truth” (p. 223). According to Popper, the implication of this theory for scientific 
truth was that any criterion of scientific truth would be valid only if subjective criteria for 
truth (such as “belief”) were replaced with the notion of correspondence to the facts (p. 
223). To illustrate this idea of objective truth, Popper makes a trivial example, “the 
statement, or the assertion, Snow is white corresponds to the facts only, and only if, snow 
is, indeed, white” (p. 224, emphasis in the original). 
In other words, according to Popper (1963, p 223), a scientific procedure must 
lead to the establishment of objective and true knowledge. However, to understand what 
he meant by the terms “objective” and “true,” it is necessary to undertake a brief 
exploration of Popper’s (1972) understanding of the role and properties of scientific 
theory.  
According to Popper (1972), the aims of scientific theory are twofold: (1) 
theoretical understanding (which can also be termed explanation); and (2) practical 
understanding (which incorporates prediction and technical explanation). Popper  
emphasised that the aim of science is to provide “satisfactory explanations” (p. 191) of 
things that are “in need of explanation” (p. 191). To do so, scientific enquiry requires 
testable hypotheses. As Popper (1972) observed: 
 
An analysis and comparison of the degrees of testability of different 
theories shows that the testability of a theory grows with its degree of 
universality as well as with its degree of definiteness, or precision. 
[emphasis in original] (p. 356) 
 
According to the positivist perspective of Popper (1972), scientists propose 
conjectures that are then subjected to attempts to refute them. Popper argue that scientific 
progress occurs by a process of empirical falsification or “refutation” (p. 13) as theories 
are tested and discarded, to be replaced with new theories that have greater universality, 
precision, and explanatory power than the preceding formulations. As Popper noted: 
“From the point of view of objective knowledge, all theories therefore remain 
conjectural” [emphasis in original] (p. 80). According to Popper (1972), objective and 
true knowledge is thus derived from a process of empirical falsification that determines 
which statements correspond to the facts (p. 46) and can therefore be regarded as 
scientific “truth” (p. 46).  
In terms of Glaserian grounded theory methodology, certain aspects of the 
correspondence dimension seem relevant. For example, referring to grounded theory, 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that “… the theory must closely fit the substantive area in 
which it will be used” (p. 237). Similarly, Glaser (1998) contends that the notion of 
fitness can be equated with validity in that it describes the extent to which concepts and 
theory reflect the data from which they are generated.  
Further evidence of the relevance of the dimension of correspondence to 
grounded theory has been provided by Glaser (1978), who notes that a grounded theory 
should work—by which he meant that it should be able to explain, predict, and interpret 
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what is happening in a specific area of interest. Taken together, the requirements that a 
grounded theory should both “fit” and “work” constitute the notion of relevance, which 
can be defined as a theory’s ability to grasp the core problems and processes of the 
subject under investigation. Such a basic social process is denoted in Glaserian grounded 
theory as a core category. 
According to Glaser (1978), such a basic social process consists of two or more 
stages, and can therefore be characterised as “processural” (p. 101). In addition, a basic 
social process has several other properties, including: (1) being pervasive (by which is 
meant a fundamental process that continues over time “irrespective of the conditional 
variation of place”); and (2) having full variability (by which is meant a process that can 
be found in different places in different forms). 
In most grounded theory studies, such a core category or basic social process is 
the cornerstone of the study. To exemplify, in Lowe’s (1997) study of mergers, the core 
category/basic social process was default remodelling, in Christiansen (2005) study of 
business management, it was opportunizing, and in Bigus (1972) study of milkmen, the 
basic social process was depicted as cultivating. These core categories or basic social 
processes are thus the centrepieces of a grounded theory study, and bind the other 
categories together. For example, in Lowe’s study of bank mergers, the core category of 
default remodelling describes the way that relationships were redesigned in three main 
ways by supporting, terminating, and neglecting.  
This search for a core category or basic social process within the grounded theory 
methodology resonates with Popper’s (1963) contention that “[a] new theory should 
proceed from some simple, new, and powerful unifying idea” [emphasis in original] (p. 
241) that connects previously unconnected things. 
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be argued that Glaserian grounded 
theory methodology incorporates certain presumptions that have similarities to the 
scientific canons proposed by Popper (1963, 1972). In particular, the insistence that 
grounded theory categories should fit the empirical data and the emphasis on a core 
category grasping the basic social process that (presumably) exists in the empirical field 
are both notions clearly related to the positivist scientific dimension of correspondence. 
These aspects of Glaserian grounded theory are in accordance with Popper’s insistence 
on the existence of objective facts that are independent of the researcher, and the need to 
determine the extent to which theoretical statements correspond to these facts.  
Another similarity between Glaserian grounded theory methodology and Popper’s 
(1972) position is the latter’s criterion of transcendence—whereby “satisfactory theories 
must … transcend empirical instances which gave rise to them” (p. 355). In a similar 
vein, Glaser (1978) argued that a grounded theory repeatedly places a researcher beyond 
the data to new research problems and ideas; that is, the theory “transcends” (p. 110) the 
substantive field of interest by being more general and abstract than the data from which 
it is derived.  
Nevertheless, despite these similarities, it is acknowledged that there are also 
salient differences between the so-called “positivist” tradition (commonly associated with 
Popper) and Glaserian grounded theory. In particular, Glaser (1978) insists that grounded 
theory should also be “modifiable” (p. 5) during and after the data-collection process 
when he observes that “… nothing is sacred if the analyst is dedicated to giving priority 
attention to data” (p. 5). This property of modifiability is not consistent with the 
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falsification criterion of science as proposed by Popper (1963, 1972) since the notion of 
modifiability is based on the perspective that a theory is never finished but subjected to 
continuously modifications.  
 
Dimension of understanding. As previously noted, the second dimension of a 
scientific theory proposed by Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994) was the dimension of 
understanding. According to Ödman (1979), the hermeneutic tradition in natural science 
focuses on understanding the world—that is, it focuses on establishing meaning and 
interpretation. In Ödman’s view, this understanding can be characterised as “inter-
subjective”—in that it is established through a “dialogue” (p. 49). Ödman (p. 56)) 
identified three forms of interpretation within the hermeneutic tradition: (1) elementary 
interpretation (which refers to everyday interpretations during daily activities); (2) 
narrative interpretation (which involves a higher level of abstraction in the process of 
interpretation); and (3) scientific interpretation (which is a more abstract interpretation 
made by a researcher). According to Ödman, the last of these, scientific interpretations 
(or theories), are more formal than the other two types of interpretation, and usually 
incorporates a broader span of incidents.  
Giddens (1984) acknowledged that scientific theories are more formal than other 
types of interpretations, but noted that it is more difficult to establish definitive categories 
of interpretation in the social sciences than it is in the natural sciences. For example, 
Giddens described what he termed double hermeneutics, which occurs when second-
order concepts created by sociologists become first-order concepts by mediating so-
called frames of meaning. In practical terms this can mean that a second order concept 
invented by social scientists, such as the term social class, is transferred and used by the 
social actors in order to orient themselves in their everyday activities. 
Giddens (1984) and Ödman (1979) thus focused on what might be termed the 
dialogical nature of understanding. This means that the process of understanding is to be 
looked upon as a dialogical process between the researcher and the subject of the 
research. In other words, social science can be looked upon as an interaction process of a 
dialogical nature between the scientists and the involved actors, which in practical terms 
can lead to construction of concepts which have the inherent ability to change both the 
perspectives and the activities performed by the actors.  
Other hermeneutic philosophers have focused on the context of the research and 
the researcher. For example, Gadamer (1975) contends that an understanding of a 
phenomenon requires researchers to recognise their own prejudices and notes that “… to 
be situated within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it 
possible” (p. 361). Thus, “a person who thinks he [sic] is free of prejudices will be 
unconsciously dominated by them” (p. 360). However, Gadamer acknowledged that 
scientists must examine the legitimacy of the “fore-meanings dwelling within [them]” (p. 
267), and must adapt these beliefs according to the phenomena being studied if they are 
to arrive at the “truth” (p. 268).  
In terms of Glaserian grounded theory methodology, the dimension of 
understanding is clearly relevant, as it is also described as a dialogical process, even 
though a somewhat different vocabulary is used compared with the hermeneutic tradition. 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), a grounded theory in any given area must be 
“understandable by laymen concerned with this area” [emphasis in original] (p. 237). 
1606  The Qualitative Report November 2011 
 
 
 
Such understanding is essential to the usefulness of the theory, because it “sharpens 
[laypersons’] sensitivity” (p. 240) with regard to present problems and potential 
solutions. To accomplish such understanding, Glaser and Strauss argue that the crucial 
concepts need to be both “analytical” (p. 38) and “sensitizing” (p. 38). Such a sensitizing 
concept is, according to Glaser (2001), a concept that has an instant grab, which enables 
people to see an underlying pattern in the things that are going on in the area of interest. 
When a theory consists of such concepts, actors can understand the theory in the light of 
their own personal experiences.  
In summary, Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) insistence that concepts should be 
abstract corresponds to Ödman’s (1979) categorisation of a hermeneutic scientific theory 
as a third order of interpretation. Furthermore, Glaserian grounded theory’s focus on 
producing so-called sensitizing concepts can be related to Giddens’ (1984) contention 
that a hermeneutic theory merges with the existing conceptual framework of the actors 
involved in the phenomenon under study. Finally, Gadamer’s (1975) views on prejudices 
are also relevant to Glaserian grounded theory methodology, in which the vexing 
question of the researcher’s presumptions is a recurring issue for discussion (Glaser, 
1998). Indeed, it can be argued that, just as Gadamer was reluctant to abandon the notion 
of one true interpretation, Glaserian grounded theory also searches for the core process 
which can only be discovered if the researcher is able to avoid pre-existing prejudices 
affecting the research process. As expressed by Glaser (1998) “The grounded theorist has 
no preconceived view of what problems they may encounter in the research or how the 
participants resolve their problem or main concern” (p. 118). 
Finally, although Glaser (1978) did note that there should be a separation of data 
from theory in grounded theory methodology, the methodology does allow for a dialogic 
research process. This resonates with Giddens’ (1984) description of a merger between 
the framework of the researcher and that of the involved actors, which implies a 
diminishing linguistic and conceptual distance between the object of the study and the 
researcher. Thus, the hermeneutic perspective of establishing meaning through an inter-
subjective and dialogical process between the social scientists and the involved actors is 
to a great extent present within Glaserian grounded theory methodology. 
 
Dimension of usefulness. As previously noted, the third dimension of a scientific 
theory proposed by Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994) was the dimension of usefulness. In 
this regard, Laudan (1977) contends that “the central cognitive test of any theory … [is] 
its adequacy as a solution of certain empirical and conceptual problems” (p. 70). Laudan 
defined such an “empirical problem” as “… anything about the world which strikes us as 
odd or otherwise in need of explanation” (p. 15).  
According to Laudan (1977), empirical problems can be divided into three 
categories: (1) unsolved problems (which are empirical problems that have not yet been 
solved by any theory); (2) solved problems (which have been solved by an existing 
theory); and (3) anomalous problems (which are not solved by a particular theory, but 
which are solved by a competing theory). According to Laudan, “… one of the hallmarks 
of scientific progress is the transformation of anomalous and unsolved problems into 
solved ones” (p. 18). 
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Whereas Laudan (1977) referred to empirical problems as phenomena that have 
not yet been satisfactorily explained, Jensen (1995) referred to practical problems, for 
which it is possible to imagine situation that is more desirable” (p. 16). 
In addition to treating empirical (or practical) problems, both Laudan (1977) and 
Jensen (1995) also discussed conceptual problems. According to Laudan (1977), a 
conceptual problem is a problem that is “… exhibited by some theory or another” (p. 48). 
This implies that conceptual problems cannot be viewed in isolation from theories, which 
sometimes is the case with empirical problems. The relationship between theory and 
conceptual problems was explained by Laudan (1996) in the following terms: “… a 
theory solves or eliminates a conceptual problem when [the theory] fails to exhibit a 
conceptual difficulty of its predecessor” (p. 81). In a similar vein, Jensen argued that a 
theoretical problem occurs when there is something wrong with existing theory, which 
can be manifested as contradictions that are puzzling. Jensen also commented upon the 
relationship between theoretical problems and practical problems, and concluded that the 
solution of a practical problem sometimes requires more knowledge in a specific area of 
interest, which, in itself, can constitute a conceptual problem. 
In terms of grounded theory methodology, the dimension of usefulness is clearly 
relevant. Indeed, Glaser (1998) stated that a grounded theory can provide two useful 
contributions to conceptual problems. First, in practical terms, grounded theory can open 
up a particular area by providing concepts that are appropriate to the real contemporary 
activities and challenges of that area of interest. Secondly, in a more theoretical sense, a 
grounded theory can synthesise and integrate existing concepts into a broader view. In 
both cases, a grounded theory clearly fulfils the criterion of usefulness. 
Moreover, the focus of grounded theory methodology is often on how actors 
control their daily endeavours. In the words of Glaser and Strauss (1967), a grounded 
theory provides the user with “… partial control over the structure and process of daily 
situations as they change through time” [emphasis in original] (p. 237). This useful 
function is accomplished by the application of a grounded theory that consists of both 
“controllable variables” (p. 245), (which give the user a feeling of control in situations of 
change), and “access variables” (p. 248), (which provide access to existing controllable 
variables). 
However, although Glaserian grounded theory methodology certainly has the 
property of usefulness; the effectiveness of this dimension is dependent on the dimension 
of understanding. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), it is important that the 
concepts generated by grounded theory are not so abstract that the sensitizing effect is 
lost. As Glaser (2007) observed, the properties of understanding and usefulness are both 
natural consequences of a theory that is well grounded in the empirical field. It is thus 
apparent that the actual groundedness, that is, the extent to which the theory is grounded 
in empirical data determines its ability to facilitate both understanding and usefulness for 
the involved actors. 
 
Summary of Applicability of Dimensions to Glaserian Grounded Theory 
 
These three dimensions of correspondence, understanding, and usefulness, which 
in this discussion represent the perspectives of positivism, philosophical hermeneutics, 
and pragmatism each have a place within a substantive theory produced by Glaserian 
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grounded theory methodology. For example, it is clear that there are similarities between 
Glaserian grounded theory methodology and the so-called positivist paradigm, as 
formulated by Popper (1963, 1972). In particular, both approaches aim to identify 
something that lies in the empirical field waiting to be discovered. Moreover, both 
approaches aim to generate transcending theories, and both seek to unify previously 
disconnected phenomena.  
It can also be argued that there are similarities between Glaserian grounded theory 
methodology and the hermeneutic tradition. For example, both approaches focus on the 
establishment of meaning and interpretation through inter-subjectivity and dialogue. 
Moreover, with regard to the vexing issue of researcher prejudices, there are 
resemblances between Glaserian grounded theory and Gadamers’ (1975) emphasis on the 
role of “fore-meanings” (p. 267) in arriving at the truth. As explained by Gadamer, “the 
important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all 
its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.” (p. 269) 
With regard to the three specific dimensions, it can be argued that usefulness and 
understanding are especially applicable to Glaserian grounded theory. Glaser probably 
emphasizes the dimension of usefulness more than other properties within his grounded 
theory methodology, and the preceding discussion has demonstrated that this property is 
strongly linked with the dimension of understanding. However, despite the influence of 
the positivist tradition on grounded theory methodology, it is acknowledged that the 
dimension of correspondence has a slightly different meaning within Glaserian grounded 
theory from that ascribed to it in the positivist research tradition. More precisely, 
correspondence in Glaserian grounded theory methodology refers to the production of a 
substantive theory that is useful for the actors in the area of interest, whereas 
correspondence in the positivist tradition has always referred to a true theory that 
corresponds to the facts. This difference of emphasis with respect to the dimension of 
correspondence obviously has implications for the notion of accuracy. In this regard, 
Glaser (2003) downplayed the importance of accuracy in grounded theory when he 
argued that this is not a first priority for grounded theory, because the methodology 
expressly envisages that theory will be continuously modified in accordance with new 
data; as a consequence, a grounded theory is always in progress and never finalised. 
Indeed, Glaser contends that “worrisome accuracy” (p. 130) is not the issue for grounded 
theory, because the principal focus for grounded theory is whether it explains “how a 
main concern is continually resolved in a substantive area and its general conceptual 
applicability” (p. 130). This pragmatic position can be contrasted with the emphasis on 
the notion of objective truth in the positivist tradition, which was expressed by Popper 
(1963) in the following terms: “… the very idea of error, or of doubt, (in its 
straightforward sense) implies the idea of an objective truth which we may fail to reach” 
(p. 226). 
It is apparent from this discussion that Glaserian grounded theory methodology 
has significant affinity with philosophical positions that emphasise the dimensions of 
understanding and usefulness, but a somewhat different interpretation of the dimension of 
correspondence. In terms of the model of Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994), the grounded 
theory methodology can thus be positioned as shown in Figure 1. 
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Correspondence 
Figure 1. Positioning Grounded Theory Methodology within the Model of Alvesson and 
Sköldberg (1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen above, within Glaserian grounded theory methodology the most 
emphasized desiderata or aims of science are that a scientific theory should be useful and 
providing understanding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The dimension of correspondence is 
there, but in a different meaning than in the perspective of Popper (1963), since it is not 
about what is true in the sense that it is corresponding to the facts (p. 223), but about 
what can bring the involved actors conceptual understanding and be useful for them. 
 
Accuracy and Credibility 
 
The above discussion raises the issue of what is meant by the notions of accuracy 
and credibility. By adopting a more instrumental and pragmatic view of “truth” (and the 
cognitive goals of science in general), Glaserian grounded theory methodology ostensibly 
leaves itself open to criticism with regard to the notions of accuracy and credibility.  
Aside from the positivist canons of validity and reliability, there are other criteria 
for the quality of qualitative research, for example, trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985); trustworthiness, rigor, and quality (Golafshani, 2003); or the act of putting data 
into a broader context by historical and structural analysis (Wainwright, 1997). Glaser 
(1998) has a different perspective on quality based on the view that a grounded theory is 
modifiable. More specifically, Glaser (2003), contends that the issues of “worrisome 
accuracy” (p. 130) and whether a theory is true or false are not relevant when pursuing 
theory that is, by its very nature, subject to continuous modification, as it aims to solve 
empirical and conceptual problems. However, if accuracy is not to be regarded as the 
primary criterion for judging the credibility of a theory generated by grounded theory 
methodology, Glaser suggests other criteria of credibility will be required. Glaser (1998) 
offers the following criteria for credibility of a grounded theory: 
 
• Fit: According to Glaser (1998) is another word for “validity” (p. 18). 
The term fit refers to whether the concepts generated in a grounded 
theory adequately describe patterns in the data. In Glaserian grounded 
theory methodology, fit is continuously sharpened during the research 
process by ongoing comparison of incoming data with existing 
categories. 
Understanding 
      Usefulness 
• Grounded Theory 
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• Workability: According to Glaser (1998) refers to whether the 
concepts account for the main concern of the participants and how it is 
“continually resolved” (p.18). 
• Relevance: Refers to whether the theory is important to the 
practitioners and whether it evokes instant “grab” (Glaser, 1998, p. 
18). 
• Modifiability: Implies that the theory is never “wrong;” rather it is 
continuously modified because, as argued by Glaser (1998), “new data 
never provides disproof, just an analytical challenge” (p. 19). 
 
Having discussed the general question of the aims of science (including the 
concept of a scientific theory, and the related issues of accuracy and credibility), it is now 
appropriate to turn to the second question posed in the Introduction: “How should a 
scientific methodology be chosen?” 
 
Choosing a Scientific Methodology 
 
With regard to the means that are adopted to achieve a certain end in scientific 
enquiry, there is a dispute about processual credibility between what might be termed the 
positivist perspective and the relativist perspective.  From the positivist perspective, there 
is a belief that strict adherence to certain methodological rules will invariably result in the 
objective truth. Popper (1963) thus argues that methodological choice is based on 
axiomatic conventions (such as correspondence to the facts), and that there is therefore no 
room for discussion about how different methodological alternatives might fulfil different 
objectives. In essence, this positivist position is based on the traditional scientific model 
of rationality, which consists of three levels of agreement (or disagreement): (1) matters 
of fact or theory; (2) matters of methodology; and (3) cognitive goals or aims of science. 
According to this schema, disagreements on the first (fact or theory) level are settled at 
the second (methodological) level, disputes at the second (methodological) level are 
settled at the third (cognitive or axiological) level, and disagreements about the third level 
(such as the cognitive goals of science) are irresolvable.  
In contrast, from the relativist perspective, Feyerabend (1975) suggests that 
adherence to prescriptive methodological principles can represent a hindrance to the 
attainment of scientific knowledge. According to this view, history shows that scientific 
progress has, more often than not, resulted from the abandonment of strict 
methodological principles, because all methodologies, no matter how well conducted, 
have their limitations. Feyerabend therefore advocates the use of so-called counter-
induction, which involves the utilisation of a combination of various methodological 
perspectives, including non-scientific methods, in order to develop knowledge of reality. 
In effect, Feyerabend’s position is that “anything goes”—a position that is not amenable 
to arguments about the justification of a chosen methodology. Indeed, Feyerabend 
questions whether there is any connection between idea and action in arguing that 
scientific progress often results from the actual dismissal of reason. For example, 
Feyerabend argues that the idea of starting with a problem that needs to be solved should 
be abandoned because, in his view, most human achievement begins with extraneous 
(and non-argumentative) activities, such as play.  
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It is thus apparent that the logical conclusion reached by extrapolation of both the 
extreme positivist perspective and the extreme relativist perspective is that the ultimate 
cognitive aims of science (and hence the choice of methodology) are not amenable to 
rational debate. Glaser (1998) argues a different position, emphasising that grounded 
theory methodology fulfils certain aims and that other methodologies fulfil other aims. 
Glaser thus took a more pragmatic view of the question of methodological choice. Glaser 
describes his view on methodological choice as, “it is merely another methodology, not a 
best methodology that replaces and supplements other methodologies. The researcher 
should always (at least try) to choose the method best for him [sic] and for the problem at 
hand” (p. 11). 
This reflects the fact that neither the extreme relativist perspective, nor the 
extreme positivist perspective represents the essentially pragmatic view of 
methodological justification adopted by Glaserian grounded theory methodology. But this 
does not mean that this position lacks scholarly support within the scientific community. 
Indeed, a well-documented view that closely resembles the approach that is apparent 
within Glaserian grounded theory methodology is that of Laudan (1984, 1996). 
According to Laudan (1984, 1996), the cognitive aims of science are not immune to 
debate, even among different paradigms. In support of this view, Laudan (1984) 
presented a reticulated model of scientific rationality (as illustrated in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  A Simplified Version of Laudan’s (1984) Triadic Network of Justification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the diagram, this model consists of the three elements of the traditional 
scientific model of rationality noted above—(1) theories; (2) methods; and (3) aims. 
However, in contrast to the traditional model, the three elements are connected in a 
“triadic network of justification” (p. 63). This means that the three elements are posited 
as being inter-related in that sense that they can justify each other in a non-hierarchical 
fashion (rather than being posited as separate hierarchical levels). As a result, a decision 
with respect to one element can be motivated from a position with respect to another 
element. For example, just as issues of facts (or theories) can constrain methods, so 
methods can justify theories; similarly, aims can justify methods, but methods must 
exhibit ”realisability” (p. 62) with respect to selected aims, that is, make it probable that a 
certain method will obtain a particular goal. According to Laudan (1984) the elements of 
this model “imply that our factual beliefs drastically shape our views of which sorts of 
methods are viable, and about which sorts of methods do in fact promote which sorts of 
aims.” (p. 62). In other words: 
Aims      Theories 
  Methods 
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• A scientific aim is justified by being methodologically realisable 
• Matters of fact (or theory) must harmonise with aims  
 
This model differs from the position adopted by both the extreme positivist 
perspective and the extreme relativist perspective by enabling different aims in science to 
be subjected to a justification process that goes beyond conventions and paradigms. By 
adopting a pragmatic criterion of realisability, that is expressing an aim of probability to 
be realised, the model thus transcends both the positivist search for true theories (which is 
difficult to maintain, because it is, as argued by Laudan (1996), impossible to ascertain 
the extent to which a nebulous criterion such as truth has been realised), and the relativist 
position that the different aims of science (and hence methodologies) are 
incommensurable. In other words, if decisions about scientific aims and methods are 
based on the triadic network of justification, such decisions become an exercise in 
empirical comparison, rather than a matter of adherence to conventions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The major conclusion of this analysis is that a Glaserian grounded theory can be 
understood as a conceptual theory that primarily aims to enhance understanding and be 
useful in the substantive field of interest. It thus fulfils the first two dimensions of any 
scientific theory, as enunciated by Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994). However, the third 
dimension of correspondence is interpreted within Glaserian grounded theory as the 
ability to depict reality in terms of relevance and usefulness, rather than as a theoretical 
property of objective “truth.” 
There is affinity between Glaserian grounded theory and the perspective of 
Popper (1963, 1972) in terms of: (1) grasping something that lies out there waiting for 
discovery (correspondence); (2) finding a core category, which is similar to Popper’s 
(1963,) search for a “simple, new, and powerful unifying idea” [emphasis in original] (p. 
241) that connects previously unconnected things; and (3) an emphasis on transcending 
theories. 
Similarly, there is relatedness between Glaserian grounded theory and 
hermeneutics in terms of: (a) the notion that concepts should be abstract; and (b) a 
dialogical research process, which relates to the hermeneutic emphasis on the diminishing 
linguistic and conceptual distance between the object of the study and the researcher.  
Glaserian grounded theory also has affinity with the more pragmatic “problem-
solving” stance, as expressed by Laudan (1977) and Jensen (1995) in terms of focusing 
on solving empirical and theoretical problems. This was expressed by Glaser (1998) as 
either “opening up” (p. 78) a new area by providing appropriate concepts or, in a more 
theoretical sense, synthesising and integrating existing concepts into a broader view. 
It is also evident that the Glaserian grounded theory methodology is pragmatic 
with regard to the question of means and ends in science. The methodology upholds a 
position outside those of the positivists and relativists in the sense that it contends that 
methodological issues are not given by the conventions that underpin both the positivist 
perspective and the relativist perspective. Rather, Glaserian grounded theory 
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methodology holds that methodological choice is, in itself, an empirical question in 
which the aims, method, and theory can justify each other in a non-hierarchical fashion. 
 
Practical implications 
 
Investigating the extent to which the different philosophical schools are present 
within Glaserian grounded theory methodology has practical implications. First, this 
discussion hopefully opens up the methodology for a broader use in the sense that it can 
be used by researchers independent of research tradition and philosophical standpoint. 
The methodology can be used by positivists to discover what actually lies undiscovered 
in the empirical field of interest or to connect and unify before unconnected categories or 
constructs. It can be used by researchers inspired by hermeneutics as a tool for creating 
dialogical understanding and inter-subjective interpretations. Or it can be used by 
researcher with a more pragmatic standpoint to create something conceptually that will be 
useful for the practitioners by solving empirical and conceptual problems. 
Second, this discussion clarifies the philosophical ingredients in Glaserian 
grounded theory methodology. By this clarification, instead of viewing this methodology 
as either objectivistic or subjectivistic, a more nuanced picture of the epistemological and 
ontological underpinnings of a grounded theory can be depicted.  
Third, in the descriptions by Glaser (for example, Glaser 1992, 2001, 2003), the 
grounded theory methodology is described as having certain specific characteristics and 
specific procedures that separate this methodology from other methodologies, and Glaser 
strongly emphasizes that they should not be mixed. This discussion places the Glaserian 
grounded theory methodology in context and shows that the methodology is not that 
orthodox in the first place. Instead, its procedures are actually compromises between 
different perspectives to begin with. This conclusion should not be looked upon as a 
problem, but rather as a possibility for broader, and perhaps a more conscious, use by 
researchers from different research traditions. 
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